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Abstract—Security is a critical issue in full duplex (FD)
communication systems due to the broadcast nature of wireless
channels. In this paper, joint design of information and artificial
noise beamforming vectors is proposed for the FD simultane-
ous wireless information and power transferring (FD-SWIPT)
systems with loopback self-interference cancellation. To guar-
antee high security and energy harvesting performance of the
FD-SWIPT system, the proposed design is formulated as a
secrecy rate maximization problem under energy transfer rate
constraints. Although the secrecy rate maximization problem is
non-convex, we solve it via semidefinite relaxation and a two-
dimensional search. We prove the optimality of our proposed
algorithm and demonstrate its performance via simulations.
Index Terms—Beamforming, coordinated jamming, full-duplex
communications, physical layer security, SWIPT.
I. INTRODUCTION
The upsurging wireless data traffic drives the industrial
and academic communities to develop efficient ways to boost
the usage of already scarce radio-frequency (RF) spectrum
in the fifth generation (5G) wireless communication systems
[1]. Full-duplex (FD) technology is considered as one of the
promising solutions due to its ability to almost double the
spectrum efficiency. However, FD nodes suffer from a strong
loopback self-interference (LSI) due to the short distance
between the transmitter and receiver sides on an FD node
[1]. Several LSI cancellation techniques are proposed in the
FD literature, e.g., digital-analog domain cancellation [2] and
spatial domain suppression [3], [4]. Due to dynamic range
limitations of the digital-analog domain cancellation reception
circuits, the spatial domain suppression, which utilizes the
spatial diversity to suppress the LSI, is required before further
processing of the received signals [3], [4].
Simultaneous wireless information and power transferring
(SWIPT) systems have received increased attention recently
[5]–[7]. Based on the energy carried by the RF signals, SWIPT
systems can deliver information signal to the user equipments
(UEs) and energy signal to the low energy-consumption energy
receivers (ERs) [6]. Hence, the integration of FD technology
into the SWIPT systems is promising due to the simultaneous
support of UEs and ERs, and the improvement of the spectrum
efficiency and the energy efficiency [8]. To avoid the attenua-
tion of the energy signal and meet energy demands, the ERs
are usually deployed near the transmitters [9]. However, the
strong received signal strength at the ERs can also benefit
eavesdropping when the ERs are malicious users. Therefore,
there exists a critical tradeoff between the security and energy
requirements at the ERs in FD-SWIPT systems. It has been
demonstrated in [10] that by using part of the transmission
power to transmit artificial noise (AN), the information leakage
to the eavesdroppers is degraded. Hence, the security in
wireless communications is improved via broadcasting the AN
[10]–[13]. Motivated by this fact, we assume that information
and AN beamforming vectors are jointly generated by the FD
base station (FD-BST) and FD user equipment (FD-UE) to
suppress the information leakage to the ERs. Another benefit
of this setup is that the FD-BST and FD-UE can coordinately
perform AN beamforming, which improves the suppression
efficiency of the information leakage [10]–[14].
Resource allocation is one of the key mechanisms to ensure
communication security in wireless communication systems,
such as FD communication systems and SWIPT systems.
On the one hand, secure resource allocation in FD com-
munication systems has been widely investigated for various
topologies, e.g., point-to-point (PtP) topology [11], [12], [15],
[16], point-to-multipoint (PtMP) topology [14], and wireless
relaying topology [4], [11], [17]. Two major optimization
problems are considered in secure FD communication systems,
namely, secrecy-capacity maximization [11], [12], [16], [17]
and transmission-power minimization [14]. For example, using
jamming signals by the legitimate receiver, the authors in [11]
studied secrecy-capacity maximization in FD communication
systems with a PtP topology. Using the secrecy-capacity region
in [18], [19], the authors in [16] proposed an alternating
optimization algorithm to obtain the locally optimal solution
to maximize the secrecy capacity of the secure FD communi-
cation systems with a PtP topology.
On the other hand, secure resource allocation in the SWIPT
systems was investigated in [8], [9], [20]–[25]. To guaran-
tee system security, different performance metrics, such as
secrecy capacity [8], [9], [21], [24] and transmission power
[20], [25], are optimized. In SWIPT with a single legitimate
UE, the authors in [9] and [21] investigated secrecy-capacity
maximization for multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers and
one single multiple-antenna eavesdropper, respectively. The
authors in [25] investigated the power-minimization problem
in SWIPT systems with multiple ERs and multiple multi-
antenna eavesdroppers under the imperfect channel state in-
formation (CSI). In addition, the authors in [22] analyzed the
secrecy capacity in SWIPT systems with a single legitimate
UE and multiple eavesdroppers, and they obtained closed-form
expressions for the security outage probability and the ergodic
security capacity. The authors in [8] studied weighted-capacity
maximization in the wireless relaying system, where the BST
operates in the FD mode and a single ER can envisage energy
and eavesdrop information from the received signals. Despite
the plethora of research works on the security of wireless
communication systems [8], [9], [11]–[16], [20]–[25], they
are mainly based on the assumption that each eavesdropper
can acquire information from one legitimate UE. Hence, the
reported secrecy rates are, generally, not achievable when the
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ER can eavesdrop information from the simultaneous UE and
BS transmissions [18], [19].
Motivated by the pioneering work on the capacity-region of
FD two-way communication systems [18], [19], we consider
a more general scenario, where there are multiple ERs in
the FD-SWIPT system. In the FD-SWIPT system, the bidi-
rectional communications between FD-BST and FD-UE place
requirements on communication security and harvested energy
at the multiple ERs. To the authors’ best knowledge, the joint
design of the information beamforming and AN vectors in the
FD-SWIPT system with multiple ERs has not been reported
in the current literature. In this work, our objective is to
maximize the secrecy rate of the FD-SWIPT system with LSI
cancellation.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows
• To avoid the saturation of the digital and analog circuits
caused by the strong LSI, we jointly design the informa-
tion and AN vectors to cancel the LSI such that a certain
secrecy rate is achieved.
• We investigate the secrecy rate maximization (SRM)
problem in FD-SWIPT systems with LSI cancellation.
• We propose a two-stage algorithm to solve the formulated
SRM problem. Numerical results are used to demonstrate
the performance of our proposed algorithm.
Notations: Vectors and matrices are shown in bold lower-
case letters and bold uppercase letters, respectively. C denotes
the set of complex numbers. ∼ stands for “distributed as”. I
denotes an identity matrix, and 0M×N denotes a zero matrix
with M rows and N columns. The expectation of a random
variable is denoted as E [·]. vec [·] converts an M ×N matrix
into a column vector of sizeMN×1. {wn}n∈N represents the
set composed of wn, n ∈ N . For a square matrixW ,W H and
Tr (W ) denote its conjugate transpose and trace, respectively.
W ≽ 0 and W ≻ 0 imply that W is a positive semidefinite
and a positive definite matrix, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model and Assumptions
We consider an FD-SWIPT system which consists of
an FD-BST, a legitimate FD-UE, and K ERs. Let K =
{1, 2, . . . ,K} be the set of ERs, where each ER can also be
the potential eavesdroppers. The FD-BST is equipped with
Na > 1 transmit antennas and a single receive antenna
for simultaneous transmission and reception over the same
frequency band. Similarly, the legitimate FD-UE is equipped
with Nb > 1 transmit antennas and a single receive antenna.
Thus, the FD-BST and the FD-UE operate in FD mode. The
k-th ER is equipped with a single receive antenna. We con-
sider frame-based communication over frequency-nonselective
fading channels with unit duration for each frame. Therefore,
the terms “power” and “energy” can be used interchangeably.
We assume that the FD-BST and the FD-UE can perfectly
estimate the CSI [4]. This assumption is reasonable since the
ERs and the FD-UE are assumed to be non-hostile legitimate
nodes in the FD-SWIPT system. However, the ERs are curious
to decode the information signals transmitted by the FD-BST
and the FD-UE. Therefore, the ERs are assumed to be the
potential eavesdroppers. At the beginning of each frame, each
node sends a pilot signal to the FD-BST. All nodes listen to
the pilot signals and estimate the channels associated with
the node sending the pilot signal. After that, the FD-BST
sends another pilot signal such that each node estimates
the CSI connected to the FD-BST. Then, the FD-UE feeds
back the estimated CSI to the FD-BST. Finally, the FD-BST
and the FD-UE use the beamforming vectors for information
transmission and the AN signals for coordinated jamming.
The transmission signals of the FD-BST and FD-UE are,
respectively, given by xa,b = wa,bsb + va and xb,a =
wb,asa + vb, where sa ∼ CN (0, 1) and sb ∼ CN (0, 1)
denote, respectively, the information-bearing signals for the
FD-BST and the FD-UE, and sa and sb are independent from
each other. The vectors wa,b ∈ CNa×1 and va ∈ CNa×1
(wb,a ∈ CNb×1 and vb ∈ CNb×1) are, respectively, the
information beamforming vector and the AN vector of the
FD-BST (FD-UE). In particular, the AN vector va (vb) is
modeled as a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector
with mean zero and covariance Va,a ≽ 0 (Vb,b ≽ 0).
Therefore, the received signal at the k-th ER is given
by yek = h
H
a,ek
wa,bsb + h
H
b,ek
wb,asa + h
H
ek
v + zek , where
hek , vec ([ha,ek ,hb,ek ]) with the channel coefficient vectors
from the FD-BST and the FD-UE to the k-th ER denoted by
ha,ek ∈ CNa×1 and hb,ek ∈ CNb×1, respectively. The term
zek ∼ CN
(
0, σ2ek
)
denotes the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at the k-th ER with zero mean and variance σ2ek ;
v , vec ([va,vb]) is the compact form of the coordinated
AN vector1. Here, the AN vector v is modeled as a circularly
symmetric Gaussian vector with zero mean and covariance
matrix V . The covariance matrix V is given by
V =
[
Va,a Va,b
Vb,a Vb,b
]
(1)
where the matrices Va,b and Vb,a are defined as Va,b =
E [vav
H
b ] and Vb,a = E [vbv
H
a], respectively.
The achievable sum data rate per unit bandwidth of the k-th
ER is given by
Cek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V )
= log
(
1 +
Tr (Ha,ekWa,b) + Tr (Hb,ekWb,a)
Tr (HekV ) + σ2ek
)
.
(2)
In addition, the following two achievable data rates per unit
bandwidth of the k-th ER are, respectively, given by
Ca,ek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V )
= log
(
1 +
Tr (Hb,ekWb,a)
Tr (Ha,ekWa,b) + Tr (HekV ) + σ2ek
)
(3)
and
Cb,ek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V )
= log
(
1 +
Tr (Ha,ekWa,b)
Tr (Hb,ekWb,a) + Tr (HekV ) + σ2ek
)
(4)
1Using the channel matrices between the legitimate nodes, the AN symbols
are generated from a pseudo-random signal which is perfectly known at the
legitimate nodes but not at the eavesdroppers. This is realized by using a short
secret key as a seed for the Gaussian pseudo-random sequence generator. The
legitimate nodes regularly change the secret key seeds to maintain the AN
sequence secured from the eavesdropper. A similar assumption can be found
in, e.g., [15], [26] and the references therein.
where Wa,b , wa,bwHa,b, Wb,a , wb,awHb,a, Ha,ek ,
ha,ekh
H
a,ek
, Hb,ek , hb,ekhHb,ek and Hek , hekh
H
ek
. The
ranks of beamforming matrices Wa,b and Wb,a are upper-
bounded as Rank (Wa,b) ≤ 1 and Rank (Wb,a) ≤ 1.
The amount of harvested energy at the k-th ER is given by
Ek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ) (5)
=η
(
Tr (HekV ) + Tr (Ha,ekWa,b) + Tr (Hb,ekWb,a) + σ
2
ek
)
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is the efficiency of the energy harvester.
In addition, the received signals at the FD-BST and the
FD-UE are given by ya = hHb,awb,asa+h
H
a,awa,bsb+h
H
av+za
and yb = hHa,bwa,bsb + h
H
b,bwb,asa + h
H
bv + zb, where za ∼
CN (0, σ2a) and zb ∼ CN (0, σ2b) denote, respectively, the
AWGN at the FD-BST and FD-UE; ha , vec ([ha,a,hb,a])
and hb , vec ([ha,b,hb,b]) denote the compact form of the
channel coefficient vectors for the FD-BST and the FD-UE.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the channel coef-
ficient vectors ha, hb and hek are statistically independent.
The information transmission rate per unit bandwidth of the
FD-UE and the FD-BST are, respectively, given by
Ca (Wa,b,Wb,a,V )
= log
(
1 +
Tr (Hb,aWb,a)
Tr (Ha,aWa,b) + Tr (HaV ) + σ2a
)
(6)
and
Cb (Wa,b,Wb,a,V )
= log
(
1 +
Tr (Ha,bWa,b)
Tr (Hb,bWb,a) + Tr (HbV ) + σ2b
)
(7)
where Ha , hahHa, Ha,a , ha,ahHa,a, Ha,b , ha,bhHa,b,
Hb , hbhHb, Hb,b , hb,bhHb,b, and Hb,a , hb,ahHb,a. Note
that the signals received by the FD-BST and FD-UE contain
the confidential information and the auxiliary information [19].
Based on the Corollary 1 in [19], the secrecy rate of the
FD-SWIPT system is obtained as
CSEC (Wa,b,Wb,a,V )
=Ca + Cb −max
{
max
k∈K
Ca,ek +max
k∈K
Cb,ek ,max
k∈K
Cek
}
(8)
where Ca, Cb, Ca,ek , Cb,ek and Cek are, respectively, defined
in (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7).
Remark 1: From (8), we observe that the secrecy
rate is related to the information transmission rates
Ca (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ) and Cb (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ) as well
as the information leakage rates Cek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ),
Ca,ek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ) and Cb,ek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ), which
indicates that the achievable rates at all nodes and the
harvested energy at the ERs depend on the information and
AN beamforming vectors. One of the major challenges in the
application of FD technology is the strong LSI. In this work,
we leverage the spatial domain technique to cancel the LSI
[3]–[5].
B. Problem Formulation
Our objective is to maximize the secrecy rate of the
FD-SWIPT system via joint design of information and AN
beamforming vectors subjected to the LSI cancellation con-
straints, the energy harvesting constraints and the maximum
transmission power constraints. Therefore, the SRM problem
is formulated as
max
Wa,b,Wb,a,V
CSEC (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ) (9a)
s.t. Tr (BaV ) + Tr (Wa,b) ≤ Pmaxa (9b)
Tr (BbV ) + Tr (Wb,a) ≤ Pmaxb (9c)
Tr (Ha,ekWa,b) + Tr (Hb,ekWb,a)
+ Tr (HekV ) + σ
2
ek
≥ P
REQ
k
η
,∀k (9d)
Tr (HaV ) = Tr (HbV ) = 0 (9e)
Tr (Ha,aWa,b) = Tr (Hb,bWb,a) = 0 (9f)
Wa,b ≽ 0,Wb,a ≽ 0,V ≽ 0 (9g)
Rank (Wa,b) ≤ 1 and Rank (Wb,a) ≤ 1 (9h)
where Pmaxa and P
max
b are maximum transmission power for
the FD-BST and the FD-UE, respectively. P REQk denotes the
required amount of harvested energy by the k-th ER. Here,
the matrices Ba and Bb are, respectively, defined as
Ba=
[
I 0Na×Nb
0Nb×Na 0Nb×Nb
]
and Bb=
[
0Na×Na 0Na×Nb
0Nb×Na I
]
.
(10)
III. SRM WITH LSI CANCELLATION
A. Feasibility Analysis
The SRM problem can be infeasible under certain channel
conditions when the values of Pmaxa and P
max
b are too low
and/or the value of P REQk is too high, k ∈ K. In the case
that the FD-BST and FD-UE do not transmit information,
the consumed transmission power will be lowest. When the
maximum transmission power of FD-BST and FD-UE cannot
satisfy the energy requirements of the ERs, the SRM problem
(9) is infeasible. Hence, the feasibility of the SRM opti-
mization problem can be checked by setting the information
beamforming matricesWa,b andWb,a to zero and solving the
following problem
Find V ≽ 0
s.t. Tr (BaV ) ≤ Pmaxa
Tr (BbV ) ≤ Pmaxb
Tr (HekV ) + σ
2
ek ≥
P REQk
η
, ∀k.
(11)
The optimization problem (11) is convex; therefore, we can
check the feasibility via CVX [27]. If the matrix V is obtained
via (11), we have (Wa,b = 0,Wb,a = 0,V ) is a feasible
solution to the SRM problem (9). Without loss of generality,
we assume the SRM problem (9) is feasible hereinafter.
B. Joint Design of Beamforming and AN Vectors
We observe that the SRM problem (9) is non-convex due
to the non-convex objective function (9a) and the rank-one
constraints in (9g). In order to develop practical algorithm
to solve the SRM problem, we introduce two parameters
θ ∈ [0, 1] and t such that the SRM problem is recast into
a parametric SRM (P-SRM) problem as
max
Wa,b,Wb,a,V ,θ,t
OBJ (Wb,a,Wa,b) (12a)
s.t. Cek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ) ≤ t, ∀k (12b)
Ca,ek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ) ≤ θt, ∀k (12c)
Cb,ek (Wa,b,Wb,a,V ) ≤ (1− θ) t, ∀k (12d)
θ ∈ [0, 1] , t ≥ 0 (12e)
(9b)− (9h) (12f)
where OBJ (Wb,a,Wa,b) = log
(
1 + Tr (Hb,aWb,a)/σ2a
)
+
log
(
1 + Tr (Ha,bWa,b)/σ2b
)− t.
With the introduced parameters, the objective function (12a)
is convex. Moreover, the constraints in (12b)-(12d) are convex
for given a parameter pair (θ, t). In order to obtain the optimal
solution to (12), we develop a two-stage algorithm by: 1)
solving the P-SRM problem under given (θ, t); 2) performing
a two-dimensional search for the optimal (θ∗, t∗).
Next, we investigate the algorithm to solve the P-SRM
problem with fixed parameters θ and t. Since the covariance
matrix of AN do not interfere the communication between
the FD-BST and the FD-UE from the constraints in (9e), we
conclude that the covariance matrix V lies in the null space
of the matrix [ha,hb]
H. Let Y denote the null space of the
matrix [ha,hb]
H, where Y can be obtained via the singular
value decomposition of the matrix [ha,hb]
H with Y
H
Y = I .
Hence, the AN vectors can be denoted as vn = Y vn,
n = 1, 2, . . . , Na +Nb − 2, where vn ∈ C(Na+Nb−2)×1, and
the covariance matrix V is obtained as
V = Y V Y
H
. (13)
where V =
∑Na+Nb−2
n=1 vnv
H
n.
Following similar arguments, we denote that the information
beamforming vectors of the FD-BST and the FD-UE as
wa,b = Xa,bwa,b and wb,a = Xb,awb,a, where wa,b ∈
C(Na−1)×1 and wb,a ∈ C(Nb−1)×1; the matrices Xa,b ∈
CNa×(Na−1) and Xb,a ∈ CNb×(Nb−1) are the null spaces of
the channel coefficient vector ha,a and hb,b withX
H
a,bXa,b =
I and X
H
b,aXb,a = I . Hence, the information beamforming
matrices of the FD-BST and the FD-UE are given as
Wa,b =Xa,bW a,bX
H
a,b (14)
and
Wb,a =Xb,aW b,aX
H
b,a (15)
where W a,b = wa,bwHa,b and W b,a = wb,aw
H
b,a.
Substituting (13)-(15) into the P-SRM problem, we obtain a
simplified P-SRM (SP-SRM) problem (16) at the top of next
page with Ha,b , X
H
a,bHa,bXa,b, Hb,a , X
H
b,aHb,aXb,a,
Ha,ek ,X
H
a,bHa,ekXa,b,Hb,ek ,X
H
b,aHb,ekXb,a,Hek ,
Y
H
HekY , Ba , Y
H
BaY and Bb , Y
H
BbY .
For a given parameter pair (θ, t), performing the semi-
definite relaxation (SDR) to the SP-SRM problem can obtain
a convex optimization problem. Therefore, the SDR version
of the SP-SRM problem can be solved via CVX [27]. Then,
we are motivated to investigate the tightness of the SDR and
obtain the following Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: When the SP-SRM problem (16) is fea-
sible and the given parameter pair (θ, t) is in the feasible
region of SP-SRM problem, there always exists a solution
(W
∗
b,a,W
∗
a,b,V
∗
) to the SDR version of the SP-SRM prob-
lem satisfying the rank-one constraints Rank(W
∗
a,b) ≤ 1 and
Rank(W
∗
b,a) ≤ 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
From Proposition 1, we observe that the optimal solutions
to the SDR version of the SP-SRM problem always satisfy
the rank-one constraints in (16i). Hence, the SDR is tight,
and we obtain the optimal solution to the SP-SRM problem
via solving the SDR version of the SP-SRM problem. The
procedure of the proposed two-stage joint information and AN
beamforming algorithm is as follows.
1) Given the parameter pair (θ, t), the FD-BST solves the
SDR version of the SP-SRM problem.
2) the FD-BST performs the two-dimensional search for the
parameter pair (θ, t).
3) Repeat Steps 1) and 2) until the optimal parameter pair
(θ∗, t∗) is obtained.
4) the FD-BST does the rank-one constraint recovery in
(25)-(27) if obtained W
∗
a,b and W
∗
b,a are not rank-one.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The simulation parameters are set as follows. In the
FD-SWIPT system, there are one FD-BST, one FD-UE and 3
ERs. The FD-BST and FD-UE are, respectively, equipped with
3 and 3 antennas. The maximum transmission power of the
FD-BST and FD-UE are 23 dBm and 20 dBm, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assume all the channels in the
FD-SWIPT system are Rayleigh fadings. The pathloss of the
BST-UE channel, BST-ER channels and UE-ER channels are
set as −35 dB, −20 dB and −20 dB, respectively. Moreover,
the LSI channels are assumed to experience Rayleigh fadings
with average power attenuation as −20 dB. The required
harvested energy of each ER is set as 2 dBm. The efficiency
of the energy harvester is 0.5.
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Fig. 1. An illustration of two-dimensional search for optimal secrecy rate.
Figure 1 shows the variation of the system secrecy rate
over the introduced maximum information leakage rate t
and the ratio of the information leakage of the FD-UE θ
based on one single channel implementation. With the color
deepening from blue to red, the system secrecy rate increases
in Fig. 1. We observe that the region with red color is a convex
region. Therefore, the system secrecy rate is jointly concave
max
W b,a,W a,b,V ,θ,t
log
(
1 +
Tr
(
Hb,aW b,a
)
σ2a
)
+ log
(
1 +
Tr
(
Ha,bW a,b
)
σ2b
)
− t (16a)
s.t.
1
exp (t)− 1
(
Tr
(
Ha,ekW a,b
)
+ Tr
(
Hb,ekW b,a
)) ≤ Tr (HekV )+ σ2ek , ∀k (16b)
1
exp (θt)− 1Tr
(
Hb,ekW b,a
) ≤ Tr (Ha,ekW a,b)+ Tr (HekV )+ σ2ek , ∀k (16c)
1
exp ((1− θ) t)− 1Tr
(
Ha,ekW a,b
) ≤ Tr (Hb,ekW b,a)+ Tr (HekV )+ σ2ek , ∀k (16d)
Tr
(
BaV
)
+ Tr
(
W a,b
) ≤ Pmaxa (16e)
Tr
(
BbV
)
+ Tr
(
W b,a
) ≤ Pmaxb (16f)
Tr
(
Ha,ekW a,b
)
+ Tr
(
Hb,ekW b,a
)
+ Tr
(
HekV
)
+ σ2ek ≥
P REQk
η
, ∀k (16g)
W a,b ≽ 0,W b,a ≽ 0 and V ≽ 0 (16h)
Rank
(
W a,b
) ≤ 1 and Rank (W b,a) ≤ 1 (16i)
θ ∈ [0, 1] and t ≥ 0 (16j)
in maximum bound of information leakage rate t and the the
ratio of the maximum information leakage rate of the FD-BST
θ. We conclude that the optimal system secrecy rate can be
obtained via our proposed two-stage joint information and AN
beamforming algorithm. Moreover, the first search dimension
is the information leakage rate, and the second search dimen-
sion is the ratio of the maximum information leakage rate of
the FD-BST. This is due to the fact that the system secrecy
rate is defined as the difference between the sum information
transmission rate Ca + Cb and the information leakage rate
max {maxk∈K Ca,ek +maxk∈K Cb,ek ,maxk∈K Cek}.
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Fig. 2. The variation of the average secrecy rate of the FD-SWIPT system
with the required harvested energy of each ER.
Figure 2 depicts the variation of the system secrecy rate
of the FD-SWIPT system with the required harvested energy
of each ER based on average of 200 implementations. We
observe that the system secrecy rate decreases monotonically
with increasing required harvested energy of each ER. When
the number of transmit antennas increases from the Na = 3
and Nb = 3, to Na = 3 and Nb = 4, the decreasing speed of
the system secrecy rate becomes smaller. Similar observations
can also be made when the the number of transmit antennas
increases from the Na = 3 and Nb = 4, to Na = 4 and
Nb = 4. This is due to the fact that more transmit antenna
enables the FD-SWIPT system to more degree of freedom to
suppress the information leakage to the ERs. We also observe
that the system secrecy rate in the case Na = 3 and Nb = 4
is lower than the system secrecy rate in the case Na = 4 and
Nb = 4. This observation can be explained as follows. Under
the same degree of freedom, increasing the maximum transmit
power at the larger antenna node (the case Na = 4 and Nb =
4) can suppress the information leakage more effectively than
increasing the maximum transmit power at the lower antenna
node (the case Na = 3 and Nb = 4).
V. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the SRM problem under the constraints
of LSI cancellation and required energy transfer rate in
FD-SWIPT systems. Numerical results demonstrated that the
optimal system secrecy rate can be obtained via the two-
dimensional search for the SRM problem. We showed that
there exists a tradeoff between the secrecy rate and energy
transfer rate. When one of the two FD nodes has more
antennas, increasing the maximum transmission power of this
FD node can improve the secrecy rate than increasing the
maximum transmission power of another FD node. Increasing
the number of antennas on the FD nodes improves the secrecy
rate of the FD-SWIPT system. Moreover, we showed that the
achievable secrecy rate decreases as the energy transfer rate
requirement increases, which is reasonable since the feasibility
region shrinks and hence a lower objective value is expected.
Finally, we showed that the impact of increasing the energy
transfer rate requirement is increased when the number of
antennas at the legitimate transmitters is low.
APPENDIX
Introducing nonnegative dual variables µ, ν,
{λk, βk, γk, ϖk}k∈K and positive semidefinite dual matrices
Σa,b, Σb,a and Υ, the Karush-Khun-Tucker conditions
associated with the matricesW b,a andW a,b are, respectively,
given as
C∗b,a −
Hb,a
σ2a + Tr
(
Hb,aW
∗
b,a
) −Σ∗b,a = 0 (17)
Σ∗b,aW
∗
b,a = 0 (18)
and
C∗a,b −
Ha,b
σ2b + Tr
(
Ha,bW
∗
a,b
) −Σ∗a,b = 0 (19)
Σ∗a,bW
∗
a,b = 0 (20)
where
C∗b,a =
K∑
k=1
(
λ∗k
et − 1 +
β∗k
eθt − 1 − γ
∗
k −ϖ∗k
)
Hb,ek
+ ν∗I (21)
and
C∗a,b =
K∑
k=1
(
λ∗k
et − 1 − β
∗
k +
γ∗k
e(1−θ)t − 1 −ϖ
∗
k
)
Ha,ek
+ µ∗I. (22)
Based on (17) and (18), we obtain
C∗b,aW
∗
b,a =
Hb,aW
∗
b,a
σ2a + Tr
(
Hb,aW
∗
b,a
) . (23)
If the matrix C∗b,a is full rank, we obtain
Rank
(
W
∗
b,a
)
=Rank
(
C∗b,aW
∗
b,a
)
= Rank
(
Hb,aW
∗
b,a
)
(24)
≤min
{
Rank
(
X
H
a,b
)
,Rank (Ha,b) ,Rank
(
Xa,b
)}
= 1.
If the matrix C∗b,a is rank deficient, we can obtain a rank-one
matrix W˜ ∗b,a via the arguments in Appendix B of [5] as
W˜ ∗b,a =W
∗
b,a −∆W ∗b,a (25)
where ∆W
∗
b,a =
∑Nb−rb−1
k=1 ςkξkξ
H
k. The vector ξk is the k-
th column of the null space of the matrix C∗b,a and ςk ≥ 0,
k = 1, 2, . . . , Nb − rb − 1 with rb as the rank of the matrix
C∗b,a. Similarly, when the matrix C
∗
a,b is rank deficient, we
obtain the rank-one matrix W˜ ∗a,b as
W˜ ∗a,b =W
∗
a,b −∆W ∗a,b (26)
where ∆W
∗
a,b =
∑Na−ra−1
k=1 ζkpikpi
H
k. The vector pik is the
kth column of the null space of the matrix C∗a,b and ζk ≥ 0,
k = 1, 2, . . . , Na − ra − 1 with ra as the rank of the matrix
C∗a,b. In order to guarantee the constraints in (16b)-(16h), we
modify the matrix V
∗
into the matrix V˜ ∗ as
V˜ ∗ = V
∗
+ Y
H
[
Xa,b∆W
∗
a,bX
H
a,b 0
0 Xb,a∆W
∗
b,aX
H
b,a
]
Y . (27)
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